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cal left. While he has castigated congressional committees for tormenting alleged 
subversives with the ordeal of exposure,3 he has also joined with Mr. Justice Doug-
las to demand equivalent protection for those suspected of racial discrimination.' 
As he has maintained that the first amendment must not be fenced to close the 
marketplace of ideas to suspected Communists,5 neither would he allow that 
marketplace to be expediently roped off from those who preach racism.6 
This book is not, however, a number of things which laymen for whom it is 
primarily intended, might suppose. It is not an accurate reflection of the con-
stitutional law of most of the cases reviewed in Mr. Justice Black's opinions; of 
the seventy-six opinions presented, forty-two are dissents. It is not even an ac-
curate reflection of the caseload of the Supreme Court; though there has been a 
marked shift to civil rights and civil liberties in the business of the Court, such 
issues still account for less than half of the Court's written opinions. Moreover, 
Mr. Justice Black's opinions are not a particularly good source for aphorisms or 
maxims from which the after-dinner speaker may hope to cull appropriate verities 
suitable for civic occasions. His prose will not serve as a liberal's supplement to 
Bartlett's Familiar Quotations, or Seldes The Great Quotations. While a number 
of his opinions concern free speech, rarely will the reader encounter the fetching 
felicity of expression to rival John Milton: 
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, 
so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to 
misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; who ever knew 
truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter? Her confuting is the 
best and surest suppressing.7 
But then, entirely to his credit, Mr. Justice Black does not qualify his occasional 
eloquence by reading in e.'tceptions for blasphemous, impious, atheistic, libelous, 
or seditious speech, as Milton did,8 nor does he omit the right of anonymous 
publication from freedom of speech, as did Milton.9 Similarly, Mr. Justice 
3. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Wilkinson v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961). 
Mr. Justice Black's attitude in these cases it to be contrasted, however, with the 
description of his own investigative conduct as a Senator in the thirties, at ·pages 
15 and 16 of the principal volume. 
4. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960). 
5. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 
U.S. 298 (1957); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
6. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 
u.s. 250 (1952). 
7. AREOPAGmcA, THE PoRTABLE MILTON 199 (Bushed. 1961). 
8. Compare id., at pp. 8, 155-56, 158, 201 with Mr. Justice Black's views in 
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. 
Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); 
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 
6; pp. 40-1, 471-77 of the principal volume. 
9. Compare Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) witk MILTON, supra 
note 7, at 204. 
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Black frequently quotes from Thomas Jefferson, but seldom does he compose 
a line of his own to equal the elegance of Jefferson's well-turned phrases: 
It is error alone which needs the support of government. Truth can stand 
·by itself.10 
But, again, unlike Jefferson, Mr. Justice Black has never found it necessary to 
fortify truth by giving his blessing to a few "wholesome" prosecutions for sedi-
tious libel.11 With very rare exceptions, the opinions of Mr. Justice Black are 
a compendium of reasons for reaching specific results in concrete cases. The re-
assurance one gets is therefore not like the evanescent inspiration so characteristic 
of Fourth-of-July oratory. It is, rather, the reassurance that beleagured individ-
uals can find practical protection, as well as poetry, in the several folds of the 
Bill of Rights. It is a reassurance which is due in large part to the care and study 
of a patient, skillful Justice. 
In certain respects, Mr. Justice Black might well be miffed at this intended 
compliment, for it necessarily emphasizes the significance of his attitudes in the 
application of the Constitution. In so doing, it suggests that the Biii of Rights is 
very much whatever the Justices say it is. This view, of course, Mr. Justice Black 
has condemned with asperity: 
I do not agree that the Constitution leaves freedom of petition, assembly, 
speech, press, or worship at the mercy of a case-by-case, day-by-day 
majority of this Court. I had supposed that our people could rely for their 
freedom on the Constitution's commands, rather than on the grace of this 
Court on an individual case basisP 
He is certainly not the first Justice to maintain that the Constitution is imper-
sonal, detached, and more stable than the predilections of its ministers, nor is he 
likely to be the last. There is, for instance, a striking similarity between Mr. 
Justice Black's view of the ascertainable certitudes of constitutional principles and 
the ministerial function of the Court, and that of Mr. Justice Roberts' familiar 
refrain: 
When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the courts as not 
conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of the 
Government has only one duty,-to lay the article of the Constitution 
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide 
whether the latter squares with the former.13 
One feels certain that the clear absolutes which Mr. Justice Black has found in 
the Constitution are not the same as those discovered by Mr. Justice Roberts. 
It may be well to remark, however, that the coincidence of their approaches un-
derscores the fact that a simplistic view of the Constitution is no guarantee of 
10. ]EFFERSON, NoTES ON VIRGINIA, reprinted in SELDES, THE GREAT QuoTA-
TIONS 363 (1960). 
11. See LEVY, ]EFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 56-66 (1963). 
12. Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 6, at 274-75. 
13. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I, 62 (1936). 
  
678 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28 
enlightened results. Precisely for this reason, we may be properly apprectattve 
of Mr. Justice Black's many contributions to civil liberties in the United States, 
without being deceived that his analytic technique is the sole, or even the best, 
means of assuring similar results when that technique is applied by other men. 
In one of the two lectures reprinted in this volume, for instance, he has ad-
vised us "that there are 'absolutes' in our Bill of Rights, and that they were put 
there on purpose by men who knew what words meant, and meant their prohibi-
tions to be 'absolutes.' "14 Thus, criminal group libel laws are not within the com-
petence of a state legislature because, for Mr. Justice Black, "the First Amend-
ment, with the Fourteenth, 'absolutely' forbids such laws without any 'ifs' or 
'buts' or 'whereases.' "15 This does not mean, of course, that literally every utter-
ance is constitutionally immune: 
The test is not that all words, writing and other communications are, at 
all times and under all circumstances, protected from all forms of govern-
ment restraint. No advocate of the test, so far as this writer is aware1 takes 
this extreme and obviously untenable position.1 6 
Rather: 
"Absolute" might mean: mandatory. It might, in other words, be a judg-
ment addressed, not to the meaning and scope of the constitutional prop-
osition, but simply to its obligatory character once that meaning and scope 
have been determined.U (Emphasis added.) 
The "absolute" approach consequently does not sanctify all speech, certainly not 
criminal solicitations, the false shouting of "fire" in a crowded theater,18 or other 
extremely dangerous "speech-acts" where lawless conduct is brigaded with ut-
terances in such a manner that the utterances themselves are "used as an essen-
tial and inseparable part of a grave offense against an important public law .... "19 
Supposedly, however, it does improve the breadth and depth of constitutional 
protection, and make the law less subjective, by focusing on the definition of 
speech to be protected and by holding that if that speech is protected, it is pro-
tected in all events. And so, the argument has run from time to time, there will 
be less judge-made law, more constitutional law, and the law itself will inevitably 
"bring a broader area of expression within the protection of the first amendment 
than the other tests do.''2o 
14. P. 33. 
15. Beauharnais v. Illinois, supra note 6. 
16. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877, 914 (1963). 
17. Frantz, Is tke First Amendment Law?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 
51 CALIF. L. REv. 729, 752 (1963). 
18. See Mr. Justice Black's interesting treatment of this most celebrated barb 
in the principal volume at pp. 477-78. See also MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITICAL FREEDOM 
25, 112-14 (1960). 
19. The language is precisely that of Mr. Justice Black in Giboney v. Empire 
Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949), holding that peaceful picketing may 
be enjoined under certain circumstances. A thoughtful effort to define such speech-
acts while distinguishing the definitional approach from the Holmsian "clear and 
present danger" formulation, is made in Emerson, supra note 16, at 917 et seq. 
20. Emerson, supra note 16, at 915. 
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One may doubt that this is nearly so. Indeed, frorri time to time the Court 
has deserted the "clear and present" relativity formulated by Holmes and ex-
pounded by Chafee,21 for an alternative absolute of deciding simply whether an 
utterance was protected, with the result that if it is not within the defined scope 
of the first amendment, it is entirely unprotected! Thus, in Roth v. United 
States,22 the Court held that "obscene" utterances, not being among the varieties 
of speech protected by the first amendment, could be made the subject of federal 
penal laws even in the absence of convincing evidence that such. utterances injure 
anyone at all: 
It is insisted that the constitutional guaranties are violated because con-
victions may be had without proof either that obscene material will per-
ceptibly create a clear and present danger of antisocial conduct, or will 
probably induce its recipients to such conduct. But, in light of our holding 
that obscenity is not protected speech, the complete answer to this argu-
ment is in the holding of this Court in Beauharnais v. People of State of 
Illinois, supra, 343 U.S. at page 266, 72 S.Ct. at page 735: 
"Libelous utterances not being within the area of constitutionally 
protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, 
to consider the issues behind the phrase 'clear and present danger.' Cer-
tainly no one would contend that obscene speech, for example, may be 
punished only upon a showing of such circumstances. Libel, as we have 
seen, is in the same class."23 
So, obscenity joined "fighting words" and "group libel" as beyond the defined 
scope of the first amendment, and men may be imprisoned for such expressions 
even though no court has determined that any personal or social harm would prob-
ably result from such speech.24 
21. FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1941); THE BLESSINGS OF 
LIBERTY (1956). This is not to suggest that a clear-and-present-danger test is an 
exclusive alternative to the definitional approach, or that it by any means guaran-
tees "more satisfactory" results than certain other characterizations. The test is, 
however, still very much alive. See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 
(1963); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, (1962); Kingsley International Pictures 
Corp. v. Regents, supra note 8. An excellent review of the Holmes' test, together 
with references to other discussions, is in McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1182, 1203-212 (1959). 
22. 354 u.s. 476 (1957). 
23. !d. at 486-87. 
24. Since Roth and Alberts, however, the Court has had sufficient misgivings 
that virtually no subsequent prosecution for, or restraint of, allegedly obscene 
material has been affirmed. See, e.g., Bantum Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 
(1963); Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962); Marcus v. Property 
Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); 
Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, supra note 8. 
To set the matter straight, it may be that Roth was really the very first time 
since the twenties that the Court held speech to be unprotected in the absence 
of evidence that such speech might, under the circumstances, result in some avoid-
able evil. While there is language in Beaukarnais that group libel is wholly un-
protected, the majority opinion by Mr. Justice Frankfurter nevertheless reviewed 
the circumstances surrounding the defendant's punishment for distributing a 
scurrilous leaflet, noted that the leaflet was "calculated to have a powerful emo-
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It is no answer to the crushing effect that this approach may have on the 
first amendment to observe that Mr. Justice Black himself has not agreed that 
tke1e varieties of speech are unprotected, for such a response explicitly reads 
back into matters of constitutional construction the very element of subjectivity 
which the test allegedly minimizes. Other Justices, reading history not unreason-
ably, have concluded differently on the scope of various sections of the Constitu-
tion, even while we have been told that a special virtue of an absolute, defini-
tional approach is to limit the discretion of the Justices and thus to enhance con-
stitutional protections. As a coldly logical matter, there is no answer to Sidney 
Hook's demonstration that a definitional approach as such, (i.e., without reference 
to the sensitivity of the Justice employing it), may facilitate the eradication of 
free speech as quickly, if not more quickly, than would the standard one of re-
quiring the Court to demonstrate in what manner a given utterance threatened 
such a grave evil as to warrant its particular avoidance or punishment by trench-
ing upon speech.25 
A different illustration of the slipperiness of a definitional approach to the 
Bill of Rights proceeds from one of Mr. Justice Black's own hypothet!cals. In 
attempting to demonstrate the hazards of balancing, he has referred to the fifth 
amendment's requirement that private property shall not be taken for public 
use without just compensation. He then brings forth a case in which a section 
of privately-owned land is desperately needed by the Government in order to 
defend the nation in time of war, under circumstances where payment for its tak-
ing "might bankrupt the nation and render it helpless in its hour of greatest 
need."26 He demonstrates that a "reasonable" balancing of comparative interests 
might well result in a decision holding that, under the circumstances, the prop-
erty could be taken without adequate compensation-a result he would not him-
self reach and one which presumably could not be reached if the fifth amendment 
is regarded as absolute. 
tional impact on those to whom it was presented," and noted also that alterna-
tive means for communicating the same ideas in more temperate language were 
available to the defendant. These findings are consistent with a determination 
that under the circumstances, the danger of racial violence resulting from the 
circulation of the leaflets in question justified post-utterance discipline through 
a line of $200, where the consequential effect on freedom of speech was relatively 
slight. Either a "clear and present danger" theory or a more general "balancing" 
theory would thus support the decision. 
The other "unprotected speech" case, CkapliMky v. New Hamp1kire, 315 U.S. 
568 (1942) is also defensible on other grounds. The Court appeared satisfied that 
the face-to-face epithets which the defendant shouted at the traffic officer were 
"likely to cause a breach of the peace" under the circumstances (id. at 573), and 
referred to Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), by way of contrast. The 
obscenity cases thus appear to stand alone for the theory that certain utterances 
may be punished directly, even absent a probability that they would result in 
some evil which government may avoid for its own or others' sakes. 
25. HooK, THE PARADoXES OF FREEDOM 39-45 (1962). The point is made 
equally well, in less passionate terms, by Charles Black, Jlrfr. ]uJtice Black, Tke 
Supreme Court, and tke Bill of Rigkt1, HARPER's MAGAZINE (Feb. 1961). 
26. Pp. 44-45. · 
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Still, the "absolute" approach does require the Court to define the scope of 
the eminent domain provision, just as it requires the Court to define the scope 
of speech to determine what is, and what is not, "absolutely" protected.21 And it 
remains entirely open to the Court to define a "taking," or to define "just com-
pensation," in a manner which sanctions the same practical result as that which 
Justice Black intends to foreclose. Certain zoning ordinances, for instance, may 
restrict the use of private property and reduce its resale value even more than 
a taking with partial compensation, yet there may be no successful constitutional 
complaint presumably because there has been no "taking" in the technical sense. 
In Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States,28 the Government requisitioned a 
steel company's entire production of steel under circumstances not unlike those 
mentioned in Mr. Justice Black's hypothetical case. The requisition order effec-
tively destroyed an assignee's contractual interest in the steel, but a unanimous 
Supreme Court determined that no compensation need be paid because the re-
sulting injury was not within the kind of "taking" contemplated by the fifth 
amendment: 
That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct 
appropriation .••• 
If, under any power, a contract or other property is taken for public use, 
the Government is liable; but if injured or destroyed by lawful action, 
without a taking, the Government is not liable.29 
If appellant's contention is sound the Government thereby took and be-
came liable to pay for an appalling number of e.xisting contracts for future 
service or delivery, the performance of which its action made impossible. 
This is inadmissible. Frustration and appropriation are essentially different 
things.30 
"Frustration" and "appropriation" may be different things in the land of words 
and law, but it is to be doubted whether the bereft plaintiff appreciated the defi-
nitional difference under the circumstances, or that he was greatly consoled to 
have lost by this means, rather than to be told frankly the reason why relief could 
not be granted. There were such reasons, to.be sure, but they were obscured rather 
than elucidated by the analytic technique of the Court. 
Charles Black, Kenneth Karst, Robert McKay, and Wallace Mendelson,at 
27. Pp. 33-34; Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 
1424, n. 105; Emerson, supra note 16, at 914; MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 18, at 112-
14. 
28. 261 u.s. 502 (1923). 
29. ld. at 510. 
30. Id. at 513. An equally apt illustration of the ease with which a "defini-
tional" approach lends itself to the elimination of previously protected constitu-
tional interests is found in the line of cases redefining a "contract" under Article 
I, § 10. See the discussion and references in STRoNG, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL 
LAw 90-91, 136-40, 508-09 (1950). 
31. See Charles Black, supra note 25; Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitu-
tional Litigation, 1960 THE SuPREME CouRT REVIEW 75; McKay, supra note 21; 
Mendelson, On The Meaning of the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, SO 
CALIF. L. REV. 821 (1962). 
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among others, have covered these isues of constitutional analysis so very well 
that it is a little gratuitous to have rehearsed them once again. The point in 
doing so, however, has not been to renew a principled criticism of Mr. Justice Black 
or of his approach to certain constitutional issues. The point is, rather, that the 
increased measure of protection for civil liberties in the United States which cur-
rently prevails under the Constitution is a far greater testimonial to Mr. Justice 
Black's personal effectiveness than his own becoming modesty would acknowledge. 
While I doubt whether the language of the Constitution or the uneven wisdom 
of the founding fathers32 requires the results which Mr. Justice Black supports, 
they nearly always permit such results and we may be grateful that he has acted 
on that permission. Mr. Dilliard's book is a most suitable, useful, and compelling 
reminder of these things. 
William W. Van Alstyne• 
32. See, e.g., LEVY, LEGACY OF SuPPRESSION (1960). 
• Assistant Professor of Law, Ohio State University. 
